Stepping Up Prosecution of Transnational Bribery Cases

December 1, 2010
FEATURING

The OECD Antibribery Convention requires parties to make promising, offering, or giving a bribe to an official of another government a crime. Although 38 countries have ratified the convention, Transparency International reports that as of the end of 2009 only seven are actively enforcing this provision. Another nine are making some effort to enforce it and have taken few if any steps to enforce the convention.

When it comes to the prosecution of officials who accepted bribes from transnational companies, there has been less activity. More effort should be invested in stepping up prosecution of bribe-payers and bribe recipients, so what is the nature of the challenge (s) that is holding back this effort? What are your views on this?

Miguel Sandstrom:
If only 7 countries are actually prosecuting transnational bribery cases, what are the main reasons and what specific measures can be taken and incentives provided to address the situation?
Jeanne M. Hauch:
While progress is occurring in prosecuting transnational bribery cases, unfortunately the rate of progress is slower than we would like. There are a variety of reasons for this.

First, in some countries there is a lack of political will to pursue transnational bribery cases. There maybe a lack of consensus within a country or parts of the power structure which oppose vigorous application of the anti bribery laws. Second, there may be a lack of legal tools, such as proper legislation and a legal procedural framework. Without laws to apply and a justice system with proper procedures, effective enforcement is almost impossible.

Third, there may be a lack of material resources, such as trained personnel and operating funds.

Fourth, since transnational bribery cases often cross jurisdictional lines by definition, countries pursuing such cases will need to avail themselves of mutual legal assistance from other jurisdictions, particularly with regard to compiling financial evidence and tracing stolen assets. Prosecutors face hurdles when seeking mutual legal assistance, such as delay and a lack of proper legal mechanisms.

Fifth, we must recognize that gathering evidence of bribery is challenging because witnesses may be fearful of retaliatory actions or even threats to their safety. If a jurisdiction is not equipped with safeguards and incentives for cooperating witnesses, such as whistleblower protection systems, the ability to mount successful prosecutions will suffer.

Finally, we see from the statistics that only a handful of countries have had success, many more have investigations in progress. Another reason we have not yet seen progress is that the length of time it takes to bring a prosecution to fruition is considerable, especially in light of immunity laws that may protect wrongdoers still in office. Despite these various obstacles, it is encouraging that we are seeing this much progress. The legal landscape is light years ahead of where it was ten years ago.

Caitlin:
What type of national enforcement action is the development community expecting?
Jeanne M. Hauch:
The development community provides money, expertise and advice to advance specific development goals. Donors, clients and beneficiaries can expect that funds and expertise are only used for the intended purposes. Any national enforcement action should be focused on this goal. While the first steps to ensure the appropriate use of funds are state-of-the-art preventative measures, enforcement action may be necessary to recover stolen funds and to serve as a deterrent against similar activity in the future. For us an additional benefit of national enforcement action is to understand how schemes that divert our funds work so that we can take steps to prevent similar schemes from being successful in the future.

Accordingly we would expect individuals who have stolen funds or have taken or paid bribes to be prosecuted and punished within their national enforcement framework. Stolen funds should be returned to the projects for which they were intended or to the donors that provided them. In a wider context enforcement action can also be of a civil, administrative or disciplinary nature. Project officials who have been identified as corrupt should be dismissed to prevent further corrupt activities. Companies that colluded and thereby profited from excessive prices can be sued for damages in some jurisdictions as well.

Tin Aquino:
How does one begin to find wrongdoers of alleged bribery cases? In developing countries, for instance, "facilitation fees" are considered by businesses as fixed costs. If the bleakest picture is to be painted, all companies offer bribes and all government officials accept bribes. What is a systematic way to zero in on these corrupt officials and business groups? When it comes to prosecution, how does one identify who should be prioritized?
Jeanne M. Hauch:
Determining how to use scarce ivestigative and prosecutorial resources is a challenge. With corruption cases, it may be useful to consider investing in the most promising cases, meaning those with the best evidence in terms of documentation of acceptance of bribes and witness statements recounting exactly how the bribery scheme worked. Of course, it is not easy. What may be the most difficult is obtaining a credible initial report. In many communities, knowledge of the wrongdoing and the wrongdoers is widespread, but fear of getting involved and lack of belief that anything will be done as a result of the report keep people from telling the authorities. Establishing a system to protect whistleblowers and raising public awareness of that system may be useful. In general, media reports are also a fruitful source of initial tips. The greatest challenge is getting from the stage of rumors that a person is corrupt to actual facts and evidence that permit prosecutors to prove it.
Shivani:
Is there enough enforcement capacity around the world? Why are countries so reluctant to punish corrupt officials?
Jeanne M. Hauch:
More enforcement capacity would, of course, improve matters. The situation is particularly dire in developing countries, where priorities are providing for basic human needs and infrastrature. In developed countries, prosecutorial resources are considerable. With increasing extraterritorial enforcement by developed countries, we may see benefits flowing to the less developed nations as well.

As for the reluctance of certain countries to punish corrupt officials, the power structure within a country may protect corrupt actors. The line of corruption may extend high into the power structure, thus giving higher-ups an incentive to protect lower-down corrupt go-betweens. Once again, strong political will and a consensus to fight corruption will be essential to progress.

Bert Denolf:
A few years ago, the UK government pulled the plug on the corruption investigation involving BAE Systems. The UK government justified this dropping of the investigation on grounds of the need to safeguard national and international security interests, although it has been speculated that the decision was rather taken to maintain good commercial relations with the Saudi government. To what extent has this decision been a (dangerous) precedent (i.e. have other countries taken similar decisions)? Was there a setback to the progress of enforcing the OECD Convention as a result of this decision?
David Hawkes:
Bert, thank you for your interesting question. Surprisingly, any kind of publicity in this area is helpful. Without getting to specific cases, my experience is that public outrage over a negative decision strengthens those who are pushing for accountability on the next case because it reinforces the public view on what is wrong and what is right. It also discourages those who try to prevent accountability from occurring because they don’t want to be at the receiving end of a similar public blow-back. Similarly a positive decision reinforces accountability and encourages those who are attempting to do the right thing in other cases.
Lambert:
As a result of the economic crisis, there seems to be more talk about enforcement. Is this only talk or is there proof that more action can actually translate in less corruption?
Jeanne M. Hauch:
In a climate of economic crisis where people desperately need the help from public resources, it makes sense that concern about resources lost to corruption is rising. There is no doubt that addressing corruption increases the flow of resources to the intended beneficiaries. It is true at all levels, from higher quantities of resources through better quality of goods and services.
Omer:
What does cross-debarment mean for an enforcement official? Has the agreement been enforced and how?
David Hawkes:
Cross-debarment means that a company or an individual that is debarred by one Multi-lateral Development Bank (MDB) is automatically debarred by other MDBs as well. This helps protect the MDBs from entities that move their schemes to the next MDB after their activities have been detected and stopped by another MDB. The agreement has been enforced now several times already and you can see the results on the MDBs’ public lists of debarred entities.
Zachary:
What do you mean by a global enforcement regime? For some countries enforcing laws is in the hands of a few. Will a global enforcement regime succeed in transferring the power of a few to a majority or vice versa?
Jeanne M. Hauch:
While the notion of a global enforcement system is a topic of lively debate, we can all hope for a consensus that bribery is wrong and should be punished. The more countries that commit to doing something about bribery, the better the opportunities for enforcement across the globe. In general, transparency and accountability will provide a strong framework on which to build enforcement.